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Abstract
Background: Medicaid programs face growing pressure to control spending. Despite evidence of clinical harms,
states continue to impose policies limiting the number of reimbursable prescriptions (caps). We examined the
recent use of prescription caps by Medicaid programs and the impact of policy implementation on prescription
utilization.
Methods: We identified Medicaid cap policies from 2001–2010. We classified caps as applying to all prescriptions
(overall caps) or only branded prescriptions (brand caps). Using state-level, aggregate prescription data, we developed
interrupted time-series analyses to evaluate the impact of implementing overall caps and brand caps in a subset of
states with data available before and after cap initiation. For overall caps, we examined the use of essential
medications, which were classified as preventive or as providing symptomatic benefit. For brand caps, we
examined the use of all branded drugs as well as branded and generic medications among classes with
available generic replacements.
Results: The number of states with caps increased from 12 in 2001 to 20 in 2010. Overall cap implementation (n= 3) led
to a 0.52 % (p < 0.001) annual decrease in the proportion of essential prescriptions but no change in cost. For preventive
essential medications, overall caps led to a 1.12 % (p = 0.001) annual decrease in prescriptions (246,000 prescriptions
annually) and a 1.20 % (p < 0.001) decrease in spending (−$12.2 million annually), but no decrease in symptomatic
essential medication use. Brand cap implementation (n = 6) led to an immediate 2.29 % (p = 0.16) decrease in branded
prescriptions and 1.26 % (p = 0.025) decrease in spending. For medication classes with generic replacements, the
decrease in branded prescriptions (0.74 %, p = 0.003) approximately equaled the increase in generics (0.79 %, p = 0.009),
with estimated savings of $17.4 million.
Conclusions: An increasing number of states are using prescription caps, with mixed results. Overall caps decreased the
use of preventive but not symptomatic essential medications, suggesting that patients assign higher priority to agents
providing symptomatic benefit when faced with reimbursement limits. Among medications with generic replacements,
brand caps shifted usage from branded drugs to generics, with considerable savings. Future research should analyze the
patient-level impact of these policies to measure clinical outcomes associated with these changes.
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Background
In 2010, Medicaid insured 51.5 million low-income
Americans at a cost of almost $390 billion [1]. With the
optional Medicaid expansion in the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and budgetary shortfalls
caused by the recent recession, states face increasing
pressure to control costs for an expanding Medicaid
population [2, 3]. Prescription drugs represent an invit-
ing cost-control target for Medicaid, with $13.7 billion
in spending in 2010 [1]. However, since many drugs are
highly effective at decreasing morbidity and mortality,
broad, untargeted limitations on drug availability may be
a counterproductive strategy.
States have instituted multiple policies to control pre-
scription costs, including limits on the number of reim-
bursable prescriptions (caps). Prior research has shown a
substantial negative impact of caps. In 1981, New
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Hampshire implemented a three drug per month limit
for Medicaid recipients, which lead to decreased use of
essential medications, increased nursing home admis-
sions, and increased use of emergency services by pa-
tients with schizophrenia [4–6]. Few recent studies have
examined the impact of prescription caps [7, 8].
Despite previously demonstrated harms, Medicaid pro-
grams continue to implement prescription caps, includ-
ing caps on branded prescriptions, a more novel
approach [9]. Due to the Medicaid expansion, these cap
policies already in place are affecting an increasing num-
ber of individuals. Given their expanding impact, under-
standing the effects of caps is critical for Medicaid
pharmacy programs and more broadly for rational
pharmaceutical benefit design.
We surveyed the use of prescription caps by Medicaid
programs from 2001–2010 and used the natural experi-
ment created by cap implementation to evaluate the im-
pact of caps on prescription use and spending. We
hypothesized that prescription use would shift away
from preventive medications in favor of medications that
provide symptomatic benefit in response to caps on total
prescriptions. Additionally, we hypothesized that the use
of branded drugs would decrease after implementation
of caps on branded prescriptions and sought to deter-
mine whether there would be a corresponding increase
in generic medication use.
Methods
Data collection
We gathered information on Medicaid policies placing
limits on the number of prescriptions reimbursed (caps)
in all 50 states and the District of Columbia from January 1,
2001 to December 31, 2010. Data sources included annual
reference volumes compiled by the National Pharmaceut-
ical Council, cross-sectional surveys from the Kaiser Family
Foundation, state websites, and direct contact with state
Medicaid offices [9, 10]. When sources conflicted, we as-
sumed that information obtained directly from states was
accurate. Additional file 1 (online Table S1) contains a list
of resources organized by state. We extracted information
on cap levels, drugs affected, recipients and medications
excepted, and dates of policy changes. We classified caps as
applying to all medications (overall caps) or branded medi-
cations only (brand caps).
We obtained prescription utilization data from the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
which provides quarterly data on aggregate drug use by
state Medicaid programs [11]. These state-level data in-
clude the number of prescriptions filled, the number of
medication units dispensed, and the Medicaid reim-
bursement for each medication, grouped by National
Drug Code (NDC). We merged Medicaid data by NDC
with the National Drug Data File from First Databank to
include information on brand/generic status and thera-
peutic class [12]. We performed quality checks to iden-
tify erroneous entries (see Additional file 1, online
methods). Non-publicly available information on manu-
facturer rebates to Medicaid programs is not included in
these data. No patient-level data were included in ana-
lyses. The study was approved by the Brigham and
Women’s Hospital institutional review board.
Samples
We considered a subset of states that had data available
for adequate time before and after cap initiation and im-
plemented overall caps or brand caps as a sole interven-
tion (see Additional file 1, online methods). In practical
terms, this meant if a state already had a cap in place in
2001, we could not include it in analyses since we did
not have pre-implementation data. This also meant that
if a state simultaneously implemented both overall and
brand cap policies, it could not be included in analyses
because the effect of a single policy change could not be
isolated. While this limited the sample size for the quan-
titative analysis, it did result in examination of a more
homogeneous group of policies. States examined imple-
menting overall caps (n = 3) included Louisiana (8 pre-
scriptions monthly), Oregon (15 unique drugs in a
6 month period), and Utah (7 prescriptions monthly).
States examined implementing brand caps (n = 6) in-
cluded Alabama (4 branded prescriptions monthly),
Illinois (3 branded prescriptions monthly), Kansas
(5 branded prescriptions monthly), Kentucky (3 branded
prescriptions monthly), Maine (5 branded prescriptions
monthly), and Washington (4 branded prescriptions
monthly). States implementing brand and overall caps were
compared to states without caps. We excluded from the
control group states that had cap policies at any point dur-
ing the study period as well as states that had excessive
missing or poor quality data, leaving the following 19 con-
trol states: Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.
Outcomes
Based on published classifications, we defined a list of
essential medications that prevent clinically significant mor-
bidity or mortality for common conditions [4, 13, 14]. We
excluded frequently overused medications, such as antiulcer
medications, antidepressants, antibiotics, analgesics, non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS), stimulants,
anxiolytics, and some anti-epileptics often prescribed for
neuropathic pain [15–18]. From these essential medica-
tions, we created a list of symptomatic essential medications
that are likely to provide substantial symptomatic relief or
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prevent symptoms within a short timeframe after use; other
medications were classified as preventive essential medica-
tions. Classifications were adapted from earlier publications
[4, 13, 14]; final assignments were reviewed and agreed
upon by consensus among physician coauthors (DL, NKC,
JA, MAF).
Symptomatic essential medications included the fol-
lowing agents: antipsychotics, anti-parkinsonian agents,
loop diuretics, short acting anti-anginal agents, short
acting bronchodilators, long acting bronchodilators, oral
corticosteroids, and anti-epileptics (excluding gabapen-
tin, pregabalin, benzodiazepines, and barbiturates). Pre-
ventive essential medications included the following
agents: anti-hyperlipidemics, anti-hypertensives, hypogylce-
mics, anti-coagulants, anti-retrovirals, anti-tubercular
agents, anti-arrhythmics, bone resorption inhibitors, long
acting anti-anginal agents, digoxin, gout preventative
agents, thyroid hormone replacement, lithium, and immu-
nosuppressants. In states implementing overall caps, we
evaluated the use of essential medications, symptomatic es-
sential medications, and preventive essential medications.
In states implementing brand caps, we evaluated the use of
all branded medications and certain medication classes for
which branded drugs and similar generics were available
during the study period [19]; we included angiotensin-
converting-enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, angiotensin re-
ceptor blockers (ARBs), calcium channel blockers
(CCBs), statins, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs), proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs), selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), and serotonin-
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs). For these
classes combined, we evaluated the use of both branded
and generic medications. For all outcomes, we exam-
ined the proportion of prescriptions and spending
accounted for by each category of medications. Abso-
lute numbers of prescriptions will change based on the
number and composition of beneficiaries in a given
time period and those data were not reliably available
for our study period; accordingly, we used proportional
outcomes.
Analyses
We calculated outcomes for the quarter in which caps
were implemented and six quarters before and after im-
plementation (13 quarters), excluding quarters prior to
2001. The timeframe for each state’s data was standard-
ized to the relative quarter in which the cap policy was
initiated [20, 21]. The weighted average of outcomes in
states without caps throughout the study period was
used as a concurrent control series [20, 21].
We next developed segmented general linear models,
adjusting for repeated observations, by using generalized
estimating equations with an autoregressive correlation
structure and a lag time of one quarter after initial cap
implementation in that state. Models included terms in-
dicating the temporal relationship of each quarter with
cap implementation, including the immediate change
(level) and ongoing change over time (slope). Terms for
interaction between level and slope indicators and an
indicator for whether states implemented or did not im-
plement a cap were included to estimate the time-trend-
adjusted effects of cap implementation.
There was considerable seasonal variation in the raw
data, so we included sine and cosine terms to adjust for
seasonality [22]. We also adjusted for level changes due
to Medicare Part D implementation. Interaction terms
between these parameters and the indicator for states
implementing caps were included to adjust for between-
group differences. In gathering policy data, we found
notifications sent to providers 1–2 quarters before cap
implementation, allowing providers to begin adjusting
prescribing patterns. To more accurately estimate the
impact of cap implementation, the quarter of implemen-
tation and the prior quarter were omitted from models.
Complete model details can be found in Additional file 1
(online methods).
We used z-test results based on estimated β-coefficients
and standard errors from the generalized linear models to
determine statistical significance at a P-value <0.05. All ana-
lyses were conducted with SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute
Inc.). To approximate the impact of cap policy changes, we
estimated the change in prescription utilization (prescrip-
tions or expenditures) attributable to cap implementation
based on segmented linear regression models. For each
state implementing a cap, we calculated the utilization after
cap implementation and the expected utilization if the cap
had not been implemented (the counterfactual) based on
these models. Next we calculated the difference between
those two numbers and adjusted to annual estimates. We
then conservatively adjusted all spending estimates down-




Table 1 shows a complete list of all states’ prescription
cap policies. We were unable to obtain policy data from
Arizona and obtained only partial information for sev-
eral states (see Additional file 1, online Table S2).
Twenty-four states had prescription caps in place for
Medicaid recipients at some point between 2001 and
2010. The number of states with caps increased from 12
in 2001 to 20 in 2010, with considerable increases in the
use of caps on total medications (overall caps) and
branded medications (brand caps) (Table 2). In 2001,
there were no states with both overall and brand caps;
by 2010, four states simultaneously used both policies.
Overall cap levels ranged from 3–15 per month; brand
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Table 1 Prescription cap policies by state, 2001-2010
State Cap policy type Policy start date Policy end date Overall prescription limit Branded prescription limit
Number of drugs (maximum number of exceptions) per member per month unless otherwise noted
Alabama Brand 7/1/2004 12/31/2007 - 4 (10)
Alabama Brand 1/1/2008 After 1/1/2011 - 5 (10)
Arkansas Overall Before 12/31/2000 After 1/1/2011 3 (3) -
California Overall Before 12/31/2000 After 1/1/2011 6 -
Colorado Overall 4/1/2003 6/2/2003 8 -
Delaware Overall 1/1/2005 5/18/2009 15 -
Delaware Overall 5/19/2009 After 1/1/2011 13 -
Florida Brand Before 12/31/2000 6/30/2005 - 4
Georgia Overall Before 12/31/2000 Oct-Dec 07e 5f
Illinois Brand 10/1/2005 After 1/1/2011 - 3
Kansas Brand 4/1/2003 After 1/1/2011 - 5
Kentucky Brand 4/19/2005 2/28/2006 - 3
Kentucky Both 3/1/2006 After 1/1/2011 4 3
Louisiana Overall 3/3/2003 4/30/2009 8 -
Louisiana Overall 5/1/2009 11/30/2010 5 -
Louisiana Overall 12/1/2010 After 1/1/2011 4 -
Mainea Brand 11/2/2004c 6/30/2007 - 5
Maine Brand 7/1/2007 After 1/1/2011 - 4
Mississippi Overall Before 12/31/2000 5/30/2002 10 -
Mississippi Overall 6/1/2002 6/30/2005 5 (1) -
Mississippi Both 7/1/2005 After 1/1/2011 5 2
New York Overall Before 12/31/2000 8/31/2010 40/43 annuallyg -
New York Overall 9/1/2010d After 1/1/2011 Clinicalh -
North Carolina Overall Before 12/31/2000 5/30/2006 6 -
North Carolina Overall 6/1/2006 After 1/1/2011 8 (3) -
Oklahoma Overall Before 12/31/2000 12/31/2003 3 -
Oklahoma Both 1/1/2004 12/31/2009 6 3
Oklahoma Both 1/1/2010 After 1/1/2011 6 2
Oregon Overall 2/1/2004 After 1/1/2011 15i -
Pennsylvaniaa Overall Before 12/31/2000 After 1/1/2011 6 -
South Carolina Overall Before 12/31/2000 7/19/2010 4 (6) -
South Carolina Overall 7/20/2010 After 1/1/2011 4 (4) -
Tennessee Both 8/1/2005 After 1/1/2011 5 2
Texas Overall Before 12/31/2000 After 1/1/2011 3 -
Utahb Overall 1/1/2002 Between 2005-2010e 7 -
Utaha,b Overall 7/1/2002 After 1/1/2011 7 -
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cap levels ranged from 2–5 per month. The mean overall
cap level (prescriptions per month) was 5.6 (n = 10, SD
2.6) in 2001 and 6.2 (n = 15, SD 3.5) in 2010. One state
with an overall cap was excluded from calculations due
to policy complexity (see Additional file 1, online re-
sults). In 2001, one state had a brand cap of 4 monthly
prescriptions; in 2010, the mean brand cap level was
3.25 (n = 8, SD 1.3).
From 2001 to 2010, 15 states implemented 17 caps
(8 overall, 9 brand) and six states removed caps (4 overall,
2 brand), though one state removed that cap for only
some recipients (see Additional file 1, online results). Four
states both implemented and removed prescription caps
(3 overall, 1 brand). Eight states changed cap levels 11
times (9 overall, 2 brand), seven of which made coverage
more restrictive for recipients. The impact of one change
in overall cap levels could not be categorized due to policy
complexity (see Additional file 1, online results). For infor-
mation on unique cap policies and policy exceptions, see
Additional file 1 (online results).
Overall cap implementation
Essential medications accounted for a greater proportion of
prescriptions (7.7 %, 95 % CI, 4.7 %-10.7 %, p < 0.001)
and a slightly greater proportion of expenditures (4.0 %,
95 % CI, −0.25 %-8.2 %, p = 0.065) in states without caps as
compared to states implementing overall caps (Table 3).
After overall cap implementation, there was a 0.13 % (95 %
CI, 0.05 %-0.21 %, p < 0.001) quarterly decrease (slope effect)
in the proportion of prescriptions for essential medications,
equivalent to 0.52 % per year. The change in slope for ex-
penditures and immediate changes (level effects) for both
comparisons were not significant (all, p > 0.10).
For preventive essential medications, there was a 0.28 %
(95 % CI, 0.11 %-0.46 %, p = 0.001) quarterly slope decrease
equivalent to 1.12 % per year in the proportion of prescrip-
tions and a 0.30 % (95 % CI, 0.17 %-0.43 %, p < 0.001) de-
crease equivalent to 1.20 % per year in the proportion of
spending after overall cap implementation (Fig. 1, Table 3);
level changes for both comparisons were not significant
(all, p > 0.10). For symptomatic essential medications, there
was a 0.19 % (95 % CI, 0.07 %-0.31 %, p = 0.002) level in-
crease in the proportion of prescriptions; however, the level
change for expenditures and slope changes for both com-
parisons were not significant (all, p > 0.10). In the three
states implementing overall caps, the decreased use of
preventive essential medications attributable to cap imple-
mentation was 246,000 prescriptions (95 % CI, 156,000-
341,000) and $12.2 million (95 % CI, $8.79-$15.5 million)
annually.
Brand cap implementation
Branded drugs accounted for approximately half of pre-
scriptions but over 80 % of expenditures (see additional
Table 1 Prescription cap policies by state, 2001-2010 (Continued)
Washington Brand 2/1/2002 6/30/2007 - 4
West Virginia Overall Before 12/31/2000 7/14/2002 10 -
West Virginiaa Overall March 2007c After 1/1/2011 4 -
a Policy affecting limited groups of recipients (see Text, Additional file 1 Digital Content 1, results)
b Utah started a new program called non-traditional Medicaid (NTM) on this date with the cap in effect. The cap for traditional Medicaid was removed between
2005 and January 2010 but remained in place for NTM (see Text, Additional file 1 Digital Content 1, results)
c Policy implemented gradually on this date
d Policy gradually implemented starting in the second half of 2008 but was not enforced until 9/1/2010
e The exact date of policy change was unclear based on available information (see Table 2, Additional file 1 Digital Content 2)
f Recipients below age 21 limited to 6 prescriptions per month
g Recipients <21 or ≥65, certified blind or disabled, or single caretaker of a child under 18 are limited to 40 prescriptions annually; all other recipients limited to 43
prescription annually (see Text, Additional file 1 Digital Content 1, results)
h Annual prescription limits based on patient clinical information (see Text, Additional file 1 Digital Content 1, results)
i May impose limitations on clients with prescriptions for more than 15 unique drugs in a 6 month period
Table 2 Medicaid prescription cap policies 2001 & 2010a
2001 2010
States Average Cap Level (range) States Average Cap Level (range)
Cap 12 20
Overall onlyb 11 5.6 (3–10) 12 6.2 (3–15)
Brand only 1 4 (−) 4 3.25 (2–5)
Both 0 4c
No cap 36 30
a Cap policies for three states in 2001 and one state in 2010 were not identified (see Table 2, Additional file 1 Digital Content 2)
b One state in 2001 and three in 2010 had overall caps affecting limited groups of Medicaid recipients (see Text, Additional file 1 Content 1, results)
c States with both cap types separately included in overall and brand average calculations
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file 1, online Figure S1). Though the proportion of
branded prescriptions decreased significantly by 0.59 %
(95 % CI, 0.42 %-0.77 %, p < 0.001) per quarter equiva-
lent to 2.36 % per year, branded expenditures did not
significantly change (p > 0.10). Brand cap implementa-
tion led to a level decrease of 2.29 % (95 % CI, 0.42 %-
4.16 %, p = 0.016) in the proportion of branded prescrip-
tions and 1.26 % (95 % CI, 0.16 %-2.36 %, p = 0.025) in the
proportion of branded expenditures; changes in slope were
not significant (all, p > 0.10). In the six states examined,
brand cap implementation was associated with a decrease
of 1.53 million prescriptions (95 % CI 305,000-2.75 million)
and $30.8 million (95 % CI −620,000-62.1 million).
Among medication classes with available generic
replacements (ACE-inhibitors, ARBs, CCBs, statins,
NSAIDs, PPIs, SSRIs, and SNRIs), brand cap imple-
mentation led to a level decrease of 0.74 % (95 % CI,
0.25 %-1.23 %, p = 0.003) in the proportion of branded
prescriptions and a contrasting level increase of 0.79 %
(95 % CI, 0.20 %-1.38 %, p = 0.009) for generic
Table 3 Impact of overall and brand cap implementation on prescription utilization
Outcome Impact of cap implementation (% change) 95 % Confidence interval
OVERALL CAP IMPLEMENTATION
Essential medications
Prescriptions Change in level −0.28 −0.75 0.19
Change in slope −0.13** −0.21 −0.05
Expenditures Change in level −0.28 −1.52 0.97
Change in slope −0.17 −0.66 0.32
Preventive essential medications
Prescriptions Change in level −0.47 −1.05 0.1
Change in slope −0.28** −0.46 −0.11
Expenditures Change in level −0.44 −1.35 0.46
Change in slope −0.30** −0.43 −0.17
Symptomatic essential medications
Prescriptions Change in level 0.19** 0.07 0.31
Change in slope 0.14 −0.05 0.34
Expenditures Change in level 0.15 −0.31 0.61
Change in slope 0.11 −0.49 0.71
BRAND CAP IMPLEMENTATION
All brand medications
Prescriptions Change in level −2.29* −4.16 −0.42
Change in slope −0.02 −0.23 0.18
Expenditures Change in level −1.26* −2.36 −0.16
Change in slope 0.08 −0.19 0.35
Brand medications in classes with generic replacementsa
Prescriptions Change in level −0.74** −1.23 −0.25
Change in slope 0.02 −0.22 0.26
Expenditures Change in level −1.27** −2.01 −0.53
Change in slope 0.05 −0.29 0.40
Generic medication in classes with generic replacementsa
Prescriptions Change in level 0.79** 0.20 1.38
Change in slope −0.08 −0.19 0.03
Expenditures Change in level 0.60 −0.12 1.31
Change in slope −0.03 −0.13 0.08
Interrupted time-series analyses modeling the impact of cap policy implementation on the proportion of prescriptions for selected groups of medications, control-
ling for Medicare Part D implementation and season. Medication use in states without prescription caps was used as a control. “Level” refers to the immediate im-
pact of cap policy implementation on proportion of medication use. “Slope” refers to the subsequent rate of change per calendar quarter in proportion of use
resulting from the cap policy. Complete model parameters can be found in Additional file 1. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
a Selected classes include: ACE-inhibitors, ARBs, CCBs, statins, NSAIDs, PPIs, SSRIs, and SNRIs
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prescriptions (Fig. 2; Table 3). While spending on these
branded drugs decreased significantly by 1.27 % (95 %
CI, 0.53 %-2.01 %, p < 0.001), increased spending on ge-
nerics was only marginally significant (0.60 %; 95 % CI,
−0.12 %-1.31 %, p = 0.10). Changes in slope were not
significant for all comparisons (all, p > 0.10). Among
these medication classes, the decreased use of branded
prescriptions attributable to cap implementation was
457,000 (95 % CI, 136,000-778,000) and the increased
use of generic prescriptions was 397,000 (95 % CI,
11,300-783,000). The decreased spending on branded
drugs attributable to brand cap implementation was
$32.8 million (95 %, CI 11.8-53.8 million), while the in-
crease in spending on generics was $15.4 million (95 %,
CI −5.02-35.9 million), resulting in estimated savings of
$17.4 million (Fig. 2c). Unadjusted outcomes for all
comparisons and complete parameter estimates for all
models can be found in Additional file 1 (online Tables
S3 and S4, respectively).
Discussion
The number of state Medicaid programs with prescrip-
tion caps rose considerably from 12 in 2001 to 20 by the
end of 2010, with a sharp rise in brand caps, a policy
used by only one state in 2001. The combined Medicaid
enrollment in the 20 states with caps in 2010 was 29.8




















































































Quarters before and after cap implementation
Overall cap
No cap
Start of cap policy
Start of cap policy
Fig. 1 Proportion of prescriptions (a) and spending (b) accounted
for by preventive essential drugs before and after implementation of
overall cap policies. Triangles and squares represent measured
proportion of utilization. Solid lines represent predicted utilization based
on models. The dotted line represents predicted utilization if overall
cap policies had not been implemented (the counterfactual). Time
is measured in calendar quarters relative to policy implementation.
The weighted average of medication use in states without prescription
caps throughout the study period was used as a control. The timeframe
for the control data was standardized relative to the quarter in which the





























































































Start of cap policy
Start of cap policy
Fig. 2 Proportion of branded (a) and generic (b) prescriptions and
estimated spending changes for classes of drugs with generic
replacements before and after implementation of brand cap policies.
Selected classes include: ACE-inhibitors, ARBs, CCBs, statins, NSAIDs,
PPIs, SSRIs, and SNRIs. a, b Triangles and squares represent measured
proportion of utilization. Solid lines represent predicted utilization
based on models. The dotted line represents predicted utilization if
brand cap policies had not been implemented (the counterfactual).
Time is measured in calendar quarters relative to policy implementation.
The weighted average of medication use in states without prescription
caps throughout the study period was used as a control. The timeframe
for the control data was standardized relative to the quarter in which the
cap policy was initiated in the intervention state. c Estimated spending
changes for medication classes with generic replacements due to brand
cap implementation, for brand drugs, generic drugs, and all drugs
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restrictiveness of recent cap policies varied greatly, par-
ticularly for overall caps, which ranged from 3–15
prescriptions per month.
Overall cap implementation led to slightly decreased
use of preventive essential medications but not essential
medications that provide symptomatic benefit. This sug-
gests that, when faced with caps, some patients are willing
to forgo medications with little symptomatic benefit to
maintain the use of those that provide short-term benefit.
Preventive essential medications include highly effective
drugs that decrease morbidity and mortality for common
conditions such as hypertension and diabetes, which affect
tens of millions of Medicaid recipients [25–29]. These are
also medications for which patients are often poorly ad-
herent [30, 31]. A policy that selectively decreases the
usage of such medications may not be cost-effective or
even cost saving when clinical consequences are taken
into account [32].
These findings are particularly concerning in the con-
text of prior evidence demonstrating the harms of over-
all caps [4–6]. In 1981, New Hampshire Medicaid
implemented a three drug per month cap that led to de-
creased use of essential medications and increased nurs-
ing homes admissions [4, 5]. As the number of effective
medications has dramatically increased over the past
several decades, the potential for overall caps to worsen
health outcomes warrants concern [25, 26].
When interpreting our results, it is important to keep
in mind the rationale for prescription cap policies. Such
policies are generally enacted to address the concern
that patients receiving support from a public insurance
program are using public funds to purchase medications
that are in some way undesirable (e.g., medications for
elective indications or those that are overly expensive).
Cap policies implicitly assume that patients will review
the list of medications they have been taking, choose
those that are most important for their overall health,
and forego less important medications. In practice, how-
ever, patients receive and fill prescriptions intermittently,
dependent mostly on when clinical visits occur. Accord-
ingly, patients are unlikely to consider their entire list of
medications, but instead are more likely to confront pre-
scription caps unpredictably when they arrive at the
pharmacy to pick up a prescription. Caps implemented
in this manner may be just as likely to prevent the filling
of important or relatively inexpensive prescriptions as to
reduce the overuse of less important treatments. Our
findings indicate that this type of policy tool may not
have the desired effect at the patient level.
Given how cap policies are implemented, it would be
challenging for physicians or pharmacists to consistently
help patients navigate these policies. Typically, caps take
effect for each individual patent at the pharmacy level.
Prescriptions exceeding the monthly cap level are not
reimbursed and patients are required to pay full price
for these medications or forego the prescriptions. Most
individuals in the United States fill prescriptions at free-
standing pharmacies not associated with outpatient
clinics. Therefore, it is unlikely that a physician writing a
new prescription would be aware at that moment of
whether a prescription exceeded an individual’s limit for
each month. It is conceivable that a primary care phys-
ician could attempt to track each Medicaid patient’s
filled prescriptions relative to the state cap; however, this
would require careful coordination between patient,
physician, and pharmacy. This might be particularly
challenging for Medicaid recipients, who have lower
levels of education and health literacy. If a patient re-
ceives prescriptions from multiple providers, this would
also complicate a physician’s ability to help patients
manage caps. Pharmacists might be able to assist pa-
tients when deciding which prescriptions to fill, though
this role would primarily be limited to patients filling
multiple simultaneous prescriptions. Prior research has
attempted to quantify the time and cost impact of phys-
ician interaction with health plans, but to our know-
ledge, there are no specific evaluations of the processes
that would be required for physicians to help patients
deal with cap policies [33].
Whether overall caps produce economic savings is un-
known. We found that overall caps generated relative
savings for some groups of medications. The 1981 New
Hampshire cap generated modest savings of ~ $400,000
compared to the subsequent $1 copayment policy; how-
ever, a conservative estimate of the costs due to in-
creased nursing home admissions approximately equaled
those savings [4, 5]. Medicare Choice recipients in
California with annual drug benefits capped at $1000
had total medical costs that were nearly identical to
those whose drug benefits were not limited, as well as
higher rates of emergency visits, hospitalizations and
death, although it is not possible to rule out case-mix
differences [34]. None of these prior analyses took into
account the costs associated with clinician or office staff
time required to address policies like these, which, as
noted, may be considerable [33].
Caps on branded drugs represent a newer policy ap-
proach that has not previously been studied. Brand cap
implementation led to significantly decreased use of
brand medications. For medication classes where thera-
peutic substitution with generics was possible, the de-
crease in branded prescriptions approximately equaled
the increase in generics. In contrast, the estimated net
savings among these medication classes was $17.4
million due to the lower cost of generics. Prior research
has demonstrated considerable economic waste due to
branded medication use when clinically equivalent or su-
perior generics are available [35–37]. For medication
Lieberman et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2016) 16:15 Page 8 of 11
classes with available generic equivalents, thoughtfully
designed brand cap policies might effectively shift use
from branded to generic medications and generate sav-
ings. We were not able to study branded medications
without available generic replacements due to inad-
equate sample size.
Our study has several limitations. Because the data are
aggregate, we cannot examine patient-level prescription
use; however, our analyses demonstrate decreases in
medication use after cap implementation, findings con-
sistent with prior patient-level studies [4–6, 34, 38].
Additionally, our approach only allowed for examination
of newly implemented caps. We analyzed the impact of
overall cap implementation in three states, though 16
employed overall caps at the end of 2010. When com-
pared to other overall caps, these three policies were
among the least restrictive (Table 1). More restrictive
policies already in place might have a considerably
greater impact on prescription use. The limited number
of states with new policies in the critical time window
and the use of aggregate quarterly data meant that our
analytic sample included a relatively small number of
observations, limiting the degrees of freedom and pre-
venting us from including additional variables in our
models. Future analyses with access to more years of
data or individual-level data might allow these factors to
be explored.
Our control group consisted of states without caps. It
is possible that those states systematically differed from
states implementing caps. States without caps had higher
baseline use of essential medications and may have dif-
fered in their patient populations or other pharmaceut-
ical cost-control policies [39]. Nonetheless, as control
states were numerous and diverse, they are probably
representative of underlying trends in prescription
utilization and provide a suitable control for co-
interventions or events at the national level (e.g., recall
of a specific drug) that would impact prescription use.
We cannot determine if prescription utilization decreased
due to changes in physician or patient behavior. It is un-
likely that the changes we observed can be explained by
out-of-pocket payment (e.g., through retail pharmacy chain
“$4 generics” programs) in this indigent population, or
by short-term use of free samples [7, 8, 40]. We also
cannot control for prescription usage among those not
affected by caps, however, the inclusion of prescriptions
used by these groups would likely weaken any associa-
tions. Other approaches, such as preferred drug lists or
more restrictive policies already in place, might also
impact prescription use.
The vulnerable nature of those insured by Medicaid
also demands special policy consideration. Medicaid pri-
marily provides coverage to children, pregnant women,
the disabled, and the elderly. Underserved racial and
ethnic minorities are also disproportionately served by
Medicaid. These populations often have reduced cap-
acity to navigate the healthcare system, increased disease
burden, limited access to healthcare, and worse health
outcomes [29, 41–43]. Indigent Medicaid recipients also
have limited disposable income to buy prescriptions not
covered by their insurance and are therefore particularly
likely to be harmed by policies limiting access to effect-
ive medications. Within the Medicaid population, caps
may disproportionately affect the disabled and the eld-
erly, leading to increased health disparities among those
socially disadvantaged groups.
Conclusion
In summary, we found a substantial increase in the use
of Medicaid prescription caps, including limits on the
overall number of prescriptions and limits on the num-
ber of branded prescriptions. Overall cap implementa-
tion led to decreased use of preventative essential
medications but not symptomatic essential medications,
suggesting that patients assign higher priority to agents
providing symptomatic benefit when faced with reim-
bursement limits. Among medication classes with avail-
able generic replacements, brand cap implementation
shifted usage from branded drugs to generics without
decreased use, resulting in considerable savings.
A substantial proportion of Medicaid recipients are af-
fected by prescription caps, a number which is likely to
grow in the coming years. The recent recession and sub-
sequent recovery have increased Medicaid enrollment
and decreased state revenues [2, 3, 44]. Additionally, the
ACA has expanded Medicaid eligibility to include people
with household incomes at or below 133 % of the federal
poverty level; this may increase Medicaid enrollment by
16–22 million by 2019, though these estimates do not
account for the Supreme Court’s decision changing the
Medicaid expansion into an optional program [45–47].
Thus, for the foreseeable future, Medicaid will be the in-
surance provider for a growing proportion of individuals
in the United States under increasing financial con-
straints. Given these challenging circumstances, states
are likely to consider additional prescription cost-control
measures. Determining the clinical and economic impact
of different policies, such as prescription caps, will help
guide sound pharmaceutical policy.
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